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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an Intermediate Appellate Opinion affirming a judgment of guilty. 
The state alleged that the defendant had violated Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. The Magistrate 
Court heard argument and found that I.C. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 on its face did not violate 
the requirements of procedural due process embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Further, the Court heard argument and found that Spirit Lake 
Ordinance 7-4-10 did not violate Article I § 13, Article XII § 2, and Article XV § § 1, 4, and 5 of 
the Idaho Constitution on its face or as applied. The Court interpreted Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-
10, and the defendant was tried under the Court's interpretation. The Court later denied the 
defendant's motion for acquittal. The Court further rejected the defendant's requested 
instruction as to the limits of the city's property. The jury found the defendant guilty. The 
defendant appealed the judgment. The District Court upheld the rulings of the Magistrate Court 
and affirmed the judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts 
On September 27, 2012, Brenda Nash moved into the home of George Darrell Adams in 
Spirit Lake, Idaho. Tr. Vol. II, p. 68, L. 8-16, p. 69, L. 13-25. With her came her son, his three 
children and fiancee Jeremy Lombardi, Stephanie Savage, Brooklyn Savage, Skylar Lombardi, 
and Aurora Lombardi. Tr. Vol. II, p. 75, L. 13-20. The home had running water, but on July 26, 
2012, the city of Spirit Lake had shut off the water and had not turned it back on until October 
18, 2012. Tr. Vol. II, p. 65, L. 2-21, p. 70, L. 16-21. 
Also on September 27, 2012, Officer Terry Wise of the Spirit Lake Police Department 
visited the mobile home of Michael Freitas. Tr. Vol. II., p. 83, L. 6-9, p. 84, L. 7-21, p. 85, L. 22-
24. The officer had noticed that Mr. Freitas, who was the neighbor of Ms. Nash, had a hose 
running from the spigot on his home to some point on Ms. Nash's home. Tr. Vol. II, p. 84, L. 22-
25, p. 85, L. 1-21. The officer believed water to be running due to water escaping at the 
connection point between separate hoses being used to stretch between the homes. Tr. Vol. II, p. 
86, L. 1-20. The officer warned Mr. Freitas that she believed he was in violation of a Spirit Lake 
Ordinance, and gave him a copy ofit. Tr. Vol. II, p. 85, L. 1-5. She cited him the following day 
for violating Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Tr. Vol. II, p. 87, L. 20-21. 
On January 3, 2013, the Magistrate Court of Kootenai County held a hearing on Mr. 
Freitas' Motion to Dismiss the charge against him. Tr. Vol. I, p. 1, L. 1, p. 22, L. 22-23. Mr. 
Freitas and the state stipulated to the factual summary in the state's Brief in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss for purposes of the hearing to provide the Court with a factual basis for the as 
applied challenge. Tr. Vol. I, p. 1, L. 8-25; p. 2, L.1-16. Additionally, the state called Barbara 
Brown, clerk-treasurer of the City of Spirit Lake. Tr. Vol. I, p. 3, L. 15-16, p. 4, L. 15-19. 
Ms. Brown testified that the City of Spirit Lake charged residential properties $15 a 
month for 12,000 gallons of water and $1.25 for every thousand thereafter. Tr. Vol. I, L. 16-22. 
The rates had been in place since either 2006 or 2007. Tr. Vol. I, p. 5, L. 23-25. Ms. Brown 
testified that the city tried to keep the prices low, and further, that at least as of a few years ago, 
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Spirit Lake's water rates were "fairly low" as compared to a lot of cities in Idaho. Tr. Vol. I, p. 6, 
L. 5-11, p. 9, L. 3-25, p. 10, L. 1-7. The city bills based on meters in the summer, and simply 
charges a flat rate in the winter. Tr. Vol. I, L. 18-23. Ms. Brown could not state how much water 
the average household uses. Tr. Vol. I, p. 6, L. 12-15. She testified that Mr. Freitas had paid for 
the water that came to his home and that he had provided to his neighbor. Tr. Vol. I, p. 8, L. 1-
18. Ms. Brown testified that Ordinance 7-4-10 has been enforced prior to this case for sharing 
water, because 
it's not appropriate, it's against the rules, and no matter where you 
live, there are rules. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 7, L. 9-16. 
The state argued that this criminalization was necessary to keep the .cost of water down and for 
sanitary reasons. Tr. Vol. I, p. 25, L. 6-7, 11-12. After hearing argument and reviewing the 
parties' motions and memorandums, the Court made the following findings as to the procedural 
due process challenge: 
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THE COURT: I certainly can't find that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications. I think there's language within the ordinance which sets forth some very 
clear meaning. So as a result, I'll find that uh, the motion to dismiss is on its void for 
vagueness challenge on its face is denied. 
Tr. p. 26, L. 15-20. 
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THE COURT: It has to create minimum guidelines for uh, those persons in the law 
enforcement and judicial community to be able to enforce the statute, also provide people 
with reasonable notice, adequate fair warning the prescribed conduct. I think the statute 
at issue here is clear. I think it can be read in its many parts given a common sense 
reading. It's unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with, tum on or 
off, permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence or 
other building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this chapter, 
or to operate or introduce any substance into any part of the City water system. 
Essentially, what it prohibits, is uh, improperly connect to the city water system, 
improperly interfering with or tampering with that system, uh, improperly connecting and 
delivering water to third persons under certain circumstances, and then improperly 
operating or introducing a substance into any part of the water system, again under 
certain circumstances. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 26, L. 22-25, p. 27, L. 1-17. 
The Court went on and appeared to find that the statute also passed rational scrutiny: 
THE COURT: Those all seem to be very clear and - - and uh, reasonable. The city 
certainly has an interest in uh, being the sole regulators of their water system, and to 
permit tampering in the way it's gone on here would essentially be to permit persons to 
set themselves up as their own private water delivery services to other individuals, and 
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then the State or the municipality of the states would lose its regulatory control over those 
persons. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 27, L. 18-25, p. 28, L. 1. 
The Court stated as to the as applied challenge: 
THE COURT: It seems clear that the defendant received notice that uh, his neighbor was 
not receiving water from the city and that essentially what happened here is in direct 
contravention of the statute, which is uh, the defendant deciding that he was going to 
circumvent the water delivery system of the municipality and provide water himself to 
this other residence, which prohibits the City in this case from having its valid regulatory 
concerns regarding the delivery of water, making sure that it's clean, making sure it's 
appropriate, billing and restricting its use, and all the other issues that arise from the 
delivery of water. So as a result, the Court finds you've failed to meet your burden 
regarding the demonstrating the statute as applied is unconstitutional. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, L. 2-16. 
Counsel for the defendant requested further findings as to the limits of the ordinance, 
whether it conflicted with the general laws, and whether it was not either unreasonable or 
arbitrary. Tr. Vol. I, p. 29, L. 9-14. The Court stated: 
THE COURT: I think I have to construe statutes to be constitutional. Obviously, the 
statute has to be confined to the limits of the jurisdictional limits of the body enacting the 
law. Uh, and I have to read the statute that way. I don't find it to be in conflict with 
other general laws of the State. In fact, I think the State statutes we reviewed specifically 
empower municipalities to make these types of uh, enactments. And then that it's not an 
unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. I think in my prior recitation I noted that I think 
that the uh, ordinance here is both reasonable and not arbitrary. And so I - - I find that 
neither of those three factors are applicable here, at least on the information that's before 
the Court here today. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 29, L. 15-25, p. 30, L. 1-4. 
After openings, the state called Barbra Brown, the Sprit Lake City Clerk. Tr Vol. II, p. 
60, L. 1-25. Ms. Brown testified that the records of the city showed that the water at 5822 West 
Rhode Island St., residence of George Adams; was shut off on July 26, 2012, and turned back on 
on October 18, 2012. Tr. Vol. II, p. 64, L. 20-25, p. 65, L. 1-21. 
The state then called Brenda Nash, who at the time of the incident had lived in George 
Adams' home. Tr. Vol. II, p. 67, L. 1-2, p. 69, L. 13-25. Ms. Nash testified that she had been 
told that the water coming to her house came from the defendant and that she used it within the 
residence. Tr. Vol. II, p. 70, L. 16-21, p. 71, L. 18-23. 
The state then called Officer Terry Wise of the Spirit Lake Police Department. Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 82, L. 3-4, p. 83, L. 8-9. She testified that on September 27, 2012, she visited the mobile 
home of Michael Freitas. Tr. Vol. II., p. 83, L. 6-9, p. 84, L. 7-21, p. 85, L. 22-24. The officer 
had noticed that Mr. Freitas, who was the neighbor of Ms. Nash, had a hose running from the 
spigot on his home to some point on Ms. Nash's home. Tr. Vol. II, p. 84, L. 22-25, p. 85, L. 1-
6 
21. The officer believed water to be running due to water escaping at the connection point 
between separate hoses being used to stretch between the homes. Tr. Vol. II, p. 86, L. 1-20. The 
officer warned Mr. Freitas that she believed he was in violation of a Spirit Lake Ordinance, and 
gave him a copy of it. Tr. Vol. II, p. 85, L. 1-5. She cited him the following day for violating 
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Tr. Vol. II, p. 87, L. 20-21. When asked whether she had had a 
conversation with the defendant, she also testified that at the time she gave him the citation, Mr. 
Freitas said that 
"it was something to the effect that um, he didn't really realize - - he didn't think that 
there was anything wrong as far - - as long as the water was going through his meter and 
he's paying for it, that he said he should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with his 
water, that he could put it in his yard or give it to a neighbor." 
Tr. Vol. II, p. 89, L. 19-25, p. 90, L. 1-3. 
After Officer Wise the state rested. Defense counsel moved for an acquittal under I.C.R. 29. 
The Court denied the motion. 
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THE COURT: Well, Rule 29 governs motions for judgment of acquittal for insufficiency 
of the evidence. The test is whether there's substantial evidence on which rational triers 
of fact could find the defendant guilty. And uh, I have to view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, keeping in mind that it's the jury that eventually has the job 
to determine credibility and weigh the evidence. 
The Court's mindful that where inculpatory evidence is so insubstantial that jurors could 
not help but have a reasonable doubt as to the proof of that element, a judgment of an 
acquittal should be entered. However, the prosecution need not have offered direct 
evidence on every element of the crime if there is otherwise a sufficient basis for the jury 
to find an element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Keeping in mind all the facts that have been presented in adopting the argument of uh, 
Ms. McClinton, the Court will deny your Rule 29 motion at this time. 
Tr. Vol. II, p 95, L. 6-24. 
The prosecutor had argued that 
[Officer Wise] indicated, when I asked that it was in fact city water, he said he was 
paying for it and he could do with it what he pleased. 
Tr. Vol. II, p. 94, L. 7-10. 
Nowhere in the record is there any indication that the prosecutor had inquired of her witnesses 
whether the water the defendant was providing was from the City of Spirit Lake. 
The Court then held a hearing on jury instructions. The defendant accepted that the 
state's elements instruction fit the law of the case and the earlier holding of the Court and did not 
object. Tr. Vol. II, p. 98, L. 1-3. The defendant offered proposed jury instruction six, requesting 
that the Court instruct the jury that 
8 
The Spirit Lake City water system is property of the City up to and including any shut-off 
valve and/or meter which may be installed at or near the property of any lot. 
Tr Vol. II, p. 99, L. 11-14. 
The Court denied the instruction. 
THE COURT: The Court determined it would not give that as it's not a clarifying uh, 
legal instruction that relates to any of the facts in dispute. While the clements certainly 
includes uh, delivery of water, there is just no factual dispute here regarding what is the 
property of what, what is the city water system, et cetera. 
(inaudible) ... persist in my ruling and not give that instruction. 
Tr Vol. II, p. 99, L. 16-22, p. 100, L. 12-13. 
The jury found the defendant guilty. Tr Vol. II, p. 117, L. 22-24. The Court then sentenced the 
defendant but ordered his sentence be stayed pending the resolution of his appeal pursuant to 
I.C.R. 54.5. Tr Vol. II, p. 122, L. 16-23, p. 124, L. 11-14. The defendant timely filed a notice of 
appeal under I.C.R. 54.l(a), et.seq. from the judgment of the Court. 
The District Court heard argument on July I, 2013, and issued an Intermediate Appellate 
Opinion on August 8, 2013, affirming the judgment and the rulings of the lower court. The 
defendant timely appealed from the District Court's ruling. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is sufficiently clear to satisfy the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
II. Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 conflicts with the General Laws of Idaho. 
Ill. Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is confined to Spirit Lake. 
IV. Whether Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is improper, unreasonable and/or arbitrary. 
V. Whether Spirit Lake Ordianance 7-4-10 as applied to this case violates the liberty 
of conscience guaranteed by the Idaho and United State Constitutions. 
VI. Whether the Magistrate Court misinterpreted the statute and thus the defendant 
was tried under the wrong elements. 
VII. Whether the Magistrate Court erred in denying the defendant's motion for 
acquittal. 





The Constitution "protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of 
noblesse oblige. [The Supreme Court] would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely 
because the Government promised to use it responsibly." United States v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. 
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1577, 1591 (2010) citing Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001 ). 
The District Court erred when it found Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 constitutional in spite of the 
fact that it lacks sufficient clarity, is not limited to the municipality, criminalizes everyday 
behaviors of Idahoans for either arbitrary or monopolistic purposes, and conflicts with the 
General Laws. 
B. Standard for Review 
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Idaho v. Button, 134 
Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997). 
C. The Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is unconstitutionally vague and thus violates the notice 
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is void for vagueness on its face. In order to comport with 
the notice requirements of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, a law must use language that 
conveys a sufficiently definite description of the proscribed conduct. 1990 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 
15, Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 90-3, 1990 WL 48948 at *2 (Idaho A.G.), citing Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); H & V Engineering v. Board of Professional Engineers, 
113 Idaho 646 (1987). As the Court wrote in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 
(1984): 
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The requirement that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of 
clarity ensure that state power will be exercised only on behalf of policies 
reflecting an authoritative choice among competing social values, educes the 
danger of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the laws, enables 
individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, and permits 
meaningful judicial review. 
Due Process also guarantees that a statute will not be so written as to allow arbitrary and 
capricious enforcement. 1990 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 15 at *2 citing LDS, Inc. v. Healy, 589 P.2d 
490 (Colo.1979). Furthermore, Due Process requires that explicit standards be created for 
individuals or groups tasked to apply basic policy. Id. citing Tuma v. Board of Nursing, l 00 
Idaho 74 (1979); Saxon Coffee Shop, Inc. v. Boston Licensing Board, 407 N.E.2d (1980); Chief 
of Fire Dept. of Worcester v. Wibley, 507 N.E.2d 256 (Mass. 1987); Wheeler v. State Board of 
Forestry, 192 Cal.Rptr. 693 (Cal.App. 1983). 
Ordinance 7-4-10 states in relevant part: 
Every part of the city water system up to, and including, any shutoff valve and/or 
meter, which may be installed at or near the property line of any lot, is the 
property of the city. It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or 
tamper with, turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of water to third 
persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise provided with 
water service in accordance with this chapter, or to operate or introduce any 
substance into any part of the city water system unless that person is acting under 
the direct supervision of a qualified employee of the city or first obtains express 
written permission from the mayor. 
This ordinance can be broken down to outlaw the following: 
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1. Connect to water for use by a third person within a residence or other 
building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this 
chapter. 
2. Interfere or tamper with water for use by a third person within a residence 
or other building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance 
with this chapter. 
3. Tum on or off water for use by a third person within a residence or other 
building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this 
chapter. 
4. Permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a 
residence or other building not otherwise provided with water service in 
accordance with this chapter. 
It is difficult to understand why the city would have concerned itself with those interfering with 
the illegal use of water by others, or why the city is not concerned about people who connect 
illegally for their own use. One way to correct the absurdity is to remove the "of water to third 
persons" language, but that fails to fix the interfering part, while removing the "not otherwise 
provided" qualifier makes the connecting part absurd. However, this Court may not correct 
absurdity, but must construe the statute as written. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896 (2011). 
Further, the ordinance begins by stating what parts of the water system are the property of 
the city, and ends by prohibiting putting things into the water system. Therefore, strictly 
construed, the "water" referred to the operative language is a reference to the water system and 
the water that still belongs to the city of Spirit Lake. 
The District Court found that the statute could be "understandably broken down." 
Intermediate Appellate Opinion at *6. However, that is not the test. The defendant asks this 
Court to recognize that, in light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent that so holds, and despite Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent to the contrary, in the context of criminal laws a Fourteenth 
Amendment, facial-vagueness challenge does not require a showing that the law is 
unconstitutionally vague in all its applications. 
Generally, the doctrine of stare decisis requires a court to follow controlling precedent 
unless there is a compelling reason to depart from such precedent. See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 131 
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Idaho 239, 240 (1998). Such reasons include where the controlling precedent is manifestly 
wrong; where it has proven over time to be unwise or unjust; or where overruling the precedent 
is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles oflaw and remedy continued injustice. Id. 
Prior precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court concludes that, in order for a facial vagueness 
challenge to a criminal law to be successful, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003) 
abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069 (U.S.Mich.2013); State v. 
Hellickson, 135 Idaho 742, 745 (2001); State v. Prather, 135 Idaho 770, 773 (2001); State v. 
Leferink, 133 Idaho 780, 784 (1999); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 199 (1998); State v. Bitt, 118 
Idaho 584, 587 (1990). 
These decisions have universally relied upon the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982), as the source of this rule. Korsen, 
138 Idaho at 712; Leferink, 133 Idaho at 784; Cobb, 132 ldaho at 199; Bitt, 118 Idaho at 587. 1 
However, reliance upon the specific standard from Village of Hoffman Estates is misplaced as it 
has been expressly stated by the United States Supreme Court to be an improper standard in the 
context of a Fourteenth Amendment, facial-vagueness challenge to a criminal law. Ko/ender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) 
(plurality opinion). 
1 While Hellickson and Prather cite to Cobb as the legal authority in support of this standard, the Court in Cobb 
cites to Village of Hoffman Estates as the legal authority for this rule. Hellickson, 135 Idaho at 746, 24 P.3d at 63; 
Prather, 135 Idaho at 773, 25 P.3d at 86. 
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The United States Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman Estates was called upon to 
address the issue of whether a local civil ordinance requiring businesses to obtain a license in 
order to sell certain classes of products was unconstitutionally vague on its face. Village of 
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 491-492. In the context of this regulatory statute, the Court held 
that, "a 'facial' challenge, in this context, means a claim that the law is 'invalid in toto - and 
therefore incapable of any valid application."' Id. at 495, n.5 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 
U.S. 452,474 (1974)). The Court in Village of Hoffman Estates proceeded to clarify that this 
rule was a "less strict vagueness test" than would normally be applied because the ordinance was 
an economic regulation and that the "degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates" 
depends upon the nature of the enactment. Id. at 498. 
The United States Supreme Court has subsequently specifically articulated that the 
standard from Village of Hojfinan Estates that required a showing that the statute was vague in 
all of its applications is not the correct standard when the law at issue imposes criminal penalties. 
Ko/ender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 358, n.8. In Ko/ender, the Court articulated several reasons 
why this standard was inapplicable where the law being challenged is a criminal law. 
Importantly, the Court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that, where a law imposes criminal 
penalties, "the standard of certainty is higher." Id. In other words, the Court will require more 
definiteness to the language of criminal laws in order to pass constitutional muster, and will 
correspondingly impose greater scrutiny to claims that a criminal law is unconstitutionally void 
for vagueness. As the Court noted, "this concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a criminal 
statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application." Id. 
15 
The Court in Ko/ender also went on to note that the standard articulated in Village of 
Hoffman Estates was a "less strict vagueness standard" applied because, "the ordinance in 
Hoffman Estates 'simply regulates business behavior,' and that 'economic regulation is subject 
to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow."' Id. ( quoting 
Village ofHojfinan Estates, 455 U.S. at 499). 
In addition, in Korsen, the Idaho Supreme Court relied upon United States v. Salerno. 
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). However,just as in Hoffman Estates, in Salerno the United States 
Supreme Court addressed a regulatory statute, not a statute which imposes criminal punishment: 
Respondents first argue that the Act violates substantive due process because the 
pretrial detention it authorizes constitutes impermissible punishment before trial. 
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, and n. 16 (1979). The Government, 
however, has never argued that pretrial detention could be upheld if it were 
"punishment." The Court of Appeals assumed that pretrial detention under the 
Bail Reform Act is regulatory, not penal, and we agree that it is. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746. Thus, application of the standards articulated m Salerno 1s 
inappropriate when the statute at issue authorizes criminal penalties, i.e. punishment. 
As shown above, prior Idaho precedent requiring a showing that a criminal law is 
impermissibly vague in all its applications is directly contrary to the express holding of the 
United States Supreme Court in Kolendar, which articulates the proper standard for a Fourteenth 
Amendment based facial-vagueness challenge to a law which imposes criminal penalties. As 
such, the line of Idaho cases which apply the "less strict vagueness standard" from cases 
addressing regulatory statutes to claims to federal constitutional claims addressing criminal 
statutes is manifestly wrong and was expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court as 
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such. Rather, because the defendant brings his claim under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the statute at issue imposes 
criminal penalties, the proper analysis to be applied is that articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Ko/ender, which allows a law which imposes a criminal penalty to be 
invalidated on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application. 461 
U.S. at 358. 
Regardless of the test to be applied however, the fact remains that the ordinance is 
essentially several sentences enmeshed in such a fashion that while an official may read what 
they choose from it, no ordinary person can possibly be expected to understand it. The examples 
the District Court gives of its interpretations of the mishmash require that one simply ignore 
whole parts of the statute. As the Supreme Court in State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 324, 325 
(1990) held: 
Ordinarily, we must construe a statute to give effect to all of its parts, if we can, 
and not construe it in a way that makes mere surplusage of one of its provisions. 
However, there is another principle of statutory construction that must be 
considered here. Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. In Thompson, the 
Court said: "This principle extends not only to the elements of the substantive 
crime, but also to the sanctions potentially involved." 
citing State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 29, 153 (1989); Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 
690 ( 1984) ( overruled on other grounds, Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166 
(1990)); State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430,437 (1980); State v. Alkire, 79 Idaho 334, 338 
(195 7). The District Court's constructions are clearly in violation of the rules of interpreting any 
statute, and certainly cannot be allowed when interpreting a law that purports to provide the 
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government with the authority to place a citizen in a cell. As it stands, the law is too confusing 
to provide either reasonable persons or the government with any idea as to how it is meant to be 
enforced. Therefore, it must be struck down. 
D. The City of Spirit Lake has no claim of ownership over water once it has been drawn. 
The City of Spirit Lake owns and operates a municipal water system. See Ordinance 7-4-
2, 7-4-3. The service sells water for use by residents in a propriety capacity. Skaggs Drug 
Centers v. City of Idaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1, 7 (1965) citing Gilbert v. Village of Bancrofi, 80 
Idaho 186 (1958); Hooton v. City of Burley, 70 Idaho 369 (1950). 
The city's relationship with its citizens as regards the water service is contractual. City of 
Grangeville v. Haskin, 116 Idaho 535 (1989). Once the water has been drawn, the resident owes 
the municipality for that water which is recorded by a meter so that the city may collect using a 
monthly bill. See Ordinances 7-4-4, 7-4-5. Municipalities are granted the power to own, 
maintain, and operate a water system by the Idaho Legislature. See J.C. § 50-323. No 
constitutional provision, law, or Spirit Lake ordinance allows the Spirit Lake to retain a 
possessory interest in the water once it has been drawn. 
E. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 violates the limits set on municipal power under Article XII 
§ 2 of the Idaho Constitution. 
18 
1. The City of Spirit Lake has no authority to pass laws criminalizing the delivery of 
water. 
I. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 conflicts with the General Laws ofldaho by 
claiming powers outside the scope of those provided by LC. § 50-1030(0. 
The Idaho Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that municipalities may exercise only 
those powers granted to them or necessarily implied from the powers granted." City of 
Grangeville, 116 Idaho at 538 citing Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160 ( 1980); Hendricks v. 
City o.f Nampa, 93 Idaho 95, 98 (1969). If there is a fair, reasonable, substantial doubt as to the 
existence of a power, the doubt must be resolved against the city. O'Bryant v. City of Idaho 
Falls, 78 Idaho 313, 320 (1956), Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. v. Village of Chubbuck, 83 
Idaho 62, 65 (1960). 
A city acts in a proprietary capacity when it owns, maintains, and operates a water system 
for the benefit of its inhabitants. Skaggs Drug Centers, 90 Idaho at 7 citing Gilbert, 80 Idaho; 
Hooton, 70 Idaho. Municipalities are granted the power to own, maintain, and operate a water 
system by the Idaho Legislature. See LC. § 50-323. The Legislature further provided that 
municipalities may: 
... prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, including the levy or 
assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges against governmental units, 
departments or agencies, including the state of Idaho and its subdivisions, for the 
services, facilities and commodities furnished by such works, or by such 
rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities, and to provide methods of 
collections and penalties, including denial of service for nonpayment of such 
rates, fees, tolls or charges; ... 
LC. 50-1030(t). 
The City of Spirit Lake passed local ordinances 7-4-2 and 7-4-3 making the city the 
owner and operator of its municipal water system. The city also provided for fees and denial of 
service. See Ordinance 7-4-4, 7-4-8. Once service is denied, the city may declare the residence 
or building unfit for habitation and a public nuisance. See Ordinance 7-4-9. 
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The city took an extra step to consolidate its power over water by passing ordinance 7-4-
10. The ordinance states: 
Every part of the city water system up to, and including, any shutoff valve and/or 
meter, which may be installed at or near the property line of any lot, is the 
property of the city. It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere 
or tamper with, turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of water to 
third persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise 
provided with water service in accordance with this chapter, or to operate or 
introduce any substance into any part of the city water system unless that person 
is acting under the direct supervision of a qualified employee of the city or first 
obtains express written permission from the mayor. [ emphasis added] 
While unclear, the ordinance arguably makes it unlawful for a person to permit connection or 
delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water 
service in accordance with this chapter. While this leads to the absurd result that a person 
commits a misdemeanor by filling a water bottle with tap water in Spirit Lake and later sharing 
that tap water with a person that does not live in their home while both are in either a home or 
building without water from Spirit Lake, criminal laws must be strictly construed, and the 
Supreme Court will not change or strike down a law for absurdity. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895; 
Sivak, 119 Idaho at 325. 
The ordinance so interpreted, however, conflicts with the powers granted the 
municipality by LC. 50-1030(t). In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 357 
(2003), the Idaho Supreme Court found that a liquor license transfer fee imposed by the city 
went beyond its statutory authority. In comparing the city ordinance with state law, the Court 
found: 
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The plain language of LC.§ 23-916 provides cities with authority to impose a 
license fee, not a transfer fee. The license fees from section 23-904, titled 
"License fees," are the fees to which the statute plainly refers. LC. § 23-916 
predates the statute allowing the state to collect transfer fees. Therefore, LC. § 
23-916 could not have been drafted to include transfer fees, since they were non-
existent when LC. § 23-916 was passed. The legislature has not changed the 
relevant language of the statute granting cities authority to collect a "license fee" 
since the passage of the transfer fee statute in 1980. The state legislature has not 
granted cities the authority to impose a transfer fee. The City exceeded its power 
in collecting the transfer fee. (footnotes omitted). 
Id. at 358. 
In this case, the City of Spirit Lake's authority is limited by LC. 50-1030(f). The state 
seeks to expand the list of possible actions a municipality may take regarding its water system to 
include criminalizing the delivery of water to third persons in a building or residence that is not 
provided with water by the city water system. See Ordinance 7-4-10. The wording of LC. 50-
1030(f) creates a nonexhaustive list of possibilities through use of the word "including." See 
Federal Lank Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 ( 1941 ). However, the 
list "including" creates is illustrative. Richardson v. National City Bank of Evansville, 141 F.3d 
1228, 1232 (7th Cir. 1998). 
In City of Grangeville, 116 Idaho at 539, the Idaho Supreme Court struck down an 
ordinance allowing a municipality to place a lien for nonpayment of utilities on a property owner 
when his tenants failed to pay. The Court found that: 
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the city may collect the charges for the water, sewer and garbage services 
provided by the city from those who use the services. This right to collect does 
not depend on any expressed or implied power of the city, but rather on principles 
of contract law that obligate one who accepts a service to pay for it. What the city 
has attempted to do here is to rewrite those principles to allow collection from the 
owner, even though the services were not ordered, contracted for, or used by the 
owner. 
Id. at 538-39. The Court held: 
An implied power to collect from an owner who had not ordered, contracted for, 
or used the service would be unreasonable because it would create a liability not 
consistent with principles of contract law. We are not prepared to read this power 
into these statutes [ referring to J.C. §§ 50-323 and 50-1030(f)]. 
Id. at 539. In other words, though not providing an exhaustive list, LC. § 50-1030(1) does not 
grant municipalities plenary authority to do whatever they wish to their citizenry for the good of 
the water system. 
The City of Spirit Lake relies on its police powers expressed in Article XII § 2 of the 
Idaho Constitution. 
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, 
all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its 
charter or with the general laws. 
The City also relies on I.C. § 50-302 which states in pertinent part: 
(1) Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and 
resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state of Idaho as may be 
expedient, in addition to the special powers in this act granted, to maintain the 
peace, good government and welfare of the corporation and its trade, commerce 
and industry. Cities may enforce all ordinances by fine, including an infraction 
penalty, or incarceration; provided, however, except as provided in subsection (2) 
of this section, that the maximum punishment of any offense shall be by fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment not to exceed six 
(6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
Neither the constitutional section nor the statute, however, can submerge the narrowing of 
authority provided in I.C. § 50-1030(±). See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 
153 (1976) ("It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statue dealing with a narrow, 
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precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more 
generalized spectrum."); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) ("Where this is no 
clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, 
regardless of the priority of enactment."). 
And so this Court is left with deciding whether criminal penalties are allowable under 
J.C.§ 50-1030(£). This question is comparable, if not the same, as the one confronted by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482 (2003). In that case: 
[the Court] addressed whether touching or kissing the chest of a prepubescent girl 
constituted lewd conduct. [The] Court held that it did not because the type of 
conduct included in the phrase "including but not limited to" must be the conduct 
of a like or similar class or character to the types of conduct specifically listed. 
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 528(2011) citing Kavajecz. 139 Idaho at 486-87. 
Thus, in the case before this Court, the municipality has been granted powers of a like or 
similar class or character to: 
... prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, including the levy or 
assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges against governmental units, 
departments or agencies, including the state of Idaho and its subdivisions, for the 
services, facilities and commodities furnished by such works, or by such 
rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities, and to provide methods of 
collections and penalties, including denial of service for nonpayment of such 
rates, fees, tolls or charges; ... 
LC. § 50-1030(f). The list clearly consists only of civil penalties. An ordinance may not 
"classify conduct more harshly than a state statute." State v. Reyes, 146 Idaho 778, 781 (Ct. App. 
2008). As the Reyes Court: 
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note[ d,] [there are] important policy implications of allowing cities and counties 
to criminalize matters the legislature has specifically chosen to decriminalize. 
Id. 
Allowing cities and counties to reclassify infractions as misdemeanors would lead 
to an inconsistent application and enforcement of the laws across the state. A 
motorist stopped for an infraction such as speeding in one city would be issued a 
citation and subjected to the infraction procedures and penalties, while the same 
motorist stopped for speeding in a city that has reclassified speeding as a 
misdemeanor may be arrested and taken to jail, request and receive an attorney 
and a jury trial, and potentially serve jail time in addition to paying a substantial 
fine. Such inconsistent treatment of similarly-situated defendants is not what the 
legislature intended or what the law allows. 
In the case before the Court, the District Court found that I.C. § 50-302 and the Art. XII § 
2 of the Idaho Constitution submerged the limiting language of I.C. § 50-1030(£). Intermediate 
Appellate Opinion at * 11. That holding is in error. First, Art. XII § 2 expressly gives the 
legislature the power to narrow and limit the authority it grants municipalities through the 
General Laws such as I.C. § 50-1030(£). Second, as previously stated, "Where this is no clear 
intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, 
regardless of the priority of enactment." Morton, 417 U.S. at 550-51. I.C. § 50-302 is the very 
definition of a general statute, and is clearly !imitable by LC. § 50-1030(£). I.C. § 50-1030(£) 
excludes the municipality's power to use criminal penalties in cases involving nonpayment of 
water service. Therefore, Ordinance 7-4-10 conflicts with the General Laws of Idaho, and must 
be struck down. 
2. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is not confined to the limits of Spirit Lake. 
A municipal corporation is granted police powers under Article XII § 2 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
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Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, 
all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its 
charter or with the general laws. 
From a review of the cases construing such constitutional provision it may be said that 
there are three general restrictions which apply to legislation under the authority conferred by 
such provision: (1) the ordinance or regulation must be confined to the limits of the 
governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not be in conflict with other general laws of 
the state, and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 
365, 374 (1965). Police powers must be used to serve the public interest. See id. at 375. 
The ordinance makes no attempt to limit its scope to the City of Spirit Lake. Every 
person engaged in any chain of events that leads to the use of water in a home not provided that 
water in accordance with the municipality's ordinances will be in violation of these laws. That 
would of course be most of Idaho. The Magistrate Court held that the statute must be construed 
to be constitutional; however, no such imperative exists. State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 
439 (2012) quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,515 (1964) ("It must be 
remembered that '[a]lthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it 
against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the 
purpose of a statute ... ' or judicially rewriting it." (quoting Scales v. US., 367 U.S. 203,211 
(1961))); Tr Vol. I, p. 29, L. 15-25. 
In Blaha v. Board of Ada Count Com 'rs, 134 Idaho 770, 777 (2000), the Court found 
that: 
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[b]eyond the corporate limits of a city, the county has jurisdiction by statute to 
accept and approve subdivision plats. See LC. § 50-1308. For the City of Eagle to 
be allowed to exercise co-equal jurisdiction with Ada County in the impact area 
lying beyond the city limits would not only be in conflict with the statute but also 
inconsistent with constitutional limitations placed on a city's powers. Article XII, 
§ 2 of the Idaho Constitution provides that any county or incorporated city or 
town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and 
other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. 
This Court has held that the power of cities and counties only exists within the 
sovereign boundaries of the cities and the counties respectively. See Clyde Hess 
Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505 (1949) (valid county 
regulation enforceable so far as territory embraced in county was concerned, 
exclusive of municipalities where the regulation was without force and effect); 
Boise City v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 789 (1977) (To give effect to a county permit 
within city limits would be to violate the separate sovereignty provisions of Idaho 
Const., art. XII, § 2.); Hobbs v. Abrams, 104 Idaho 205 (1983) ( ordinance or 
regulation must be confined to the limits of the governmental body enacting the 
same). Therefore, any reading of the implementing ordinances granting the City 
the power to restrict development in the impact area by denying approval of a 
subdivision application made to the County would be an extraterritorial exercise 
of jurisdiction by the City and an infringement on the constitutional right of the 
County. (footnotes omitted). 
Ordinance 7-4-10 does not limit itself to the City of Spirit Lake and is therefore in violation of 
the Idaho Constitution. 
3. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is improper, unreasonable and/or arbitrary. 
A municipal corporation is granted police powers under Article XII § 2 of the Idaho 
Constitution: 
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Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, 
all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its 
charter or with the general laws. 
From a review of the cases construing such constitutional provision it may be said that 
there are three general restrictions which apply to legislation under the authority conferred by 
such provision: ( 1) the ordinance or regulation must be confined to the limits of the 
governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not be in conflict with other general laws of 
the state, and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 
at 374. Police powers must be used to serve the public interest. See id. at 375. 
Ordinance 7-4-10 is argued by the state to make it illegal to provide water being paid for 
in one place to a person in a residence or building not provided with water by the City of Spirit 
Lake. The state argued that this criminalization was necessary to keep the cost of water down 
and for sanitary reasons. Tr. Vol. I, p. 25, L. 6-7, 11-12. The Magistrate Court found that the city 
has an interest in being the sole regulator of water delivery. Tr. Vol. I, p. 27, L. 18-25, p. 28, L. 
1. The District Court let this holding stand by not commenting on it. 
As to the state's first contention and the Court's finding oflegitimate purpose, the city's 
interest in being sole regulator of water delivery and its need to prevent competition fails to be 
proper. The municipality's attempt at monopolization runs afoul of§ 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 45, and§ 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 
U.S.C. § 18. "Because municipalities and other political subdivisions are not themselves 
sovereign, state-action immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), does not apply to 
them directly." FTC. v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., No. 11-1160. --- S.Ct. ----, 2013 
WL 598434 at *6 (U.S.2013) citing Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 
370 (1991 ); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411-413 (1978) (plurality 
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opinion). "At the same time, however, substate governmental entities do receive immunity from 
antitrust scrutiny when they act 'pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation 
or monopoly public service."' Id. citing Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S., at 413. 
In order for a Court to find that Spirit Lake's monopoly does not violate federal law, it 
must be able to find that the state clearly articulated its intention that the city could consolidate 
power over water delivery by criminalizing the act if done by others. See Phoebe Putney Health 
System, Inc., 2013 WL 598434 at *7. In Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., the United States 
Supreme Court found that the act of a Georgia municipality in buying out its competition was not 
protected from the anti-trust act as there was no clear articulation from the state government that 
municipalities could behave in such an anticompetitive manner. Id. at *7. The Court found: 
28 
Our case law makes clear that state-law authority to act is insufficient to establish 
state-action immunity; the substate governmental entity must also show that it has 
been delegated authority to act or regulate anticompetitively. In Boulder, we held 
that Colorado's Home Rule Amendment allowing municipalities to govern local 
affairs did not satisfy the clear-articulation test. There was no doubt in that case 
that the city had authority as a matter of state law to pass an ordinance imposing a 
moratorium on a cable provider's expansion of service. But we rejected the 
proposition that "the general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily 
implies state authorization to enact specific anticompetitive ordinances" because 
such an approach "would wholly eviscerate the concepts of 'clear articulation and 
affirmative expression' that our precedents require." We explained that when a 
State's position "is one of mere neutrality respecting the municipal actions 
challenged as anticompetitive," the State cannot be said to have" 'contemplated' 
"those anticompetitive actions. 
The principle articulated in Boulder controls this case. Grants of general corporate 
power that allow substate governmental entities to participate in a competitive 
marketplace should be, can be, and typically are used in ways that raise no federal 
antitrust concerns. As a result, a State that has delegated such general powers "can 
hardly be said to have 'contemplated' "that they will be used anticompetitively. 
Thus, while the Law does allow the Authority to acquire hospitals, it does not 
clearly articulate and affirmatively express a state policy empowering the 
Authority to make acquisitions of existing hospitals that will substantially lessen 
competition. 
Id. citing Omni, 499 U.S., at 372; Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 45-
46, 55-56 (1982); IA P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law il 225a, p. 131 (3d ed.2006) 
("When a state grants power to an inferior entity, it presumably grants the power to do the thing 
contemplated, but not to do so anticompetitively"). 
states: 
The City of Spirit Lake is granted authority to run a water system by I.C. § 50-323 which 
[ c ]ities are hereby empowered to establish, create, develop, maintain and operate 
domestic water systems; provide for domestic water from wells, streams, water 
sheds or any other source; provide for storage, treatment and transmission of the 
same to the inhabitants of the city; and to do all things necessary to protect the 
source of water from contamination. The term "domestic water systems" and 
"domestic water" includes by way of example but not by way of limitation, a 
public water system providing water at any temperature for space heating or 
cooling, culinary, sanitary, recreational or therapeutic uses. 
LC. § 50-323 is a "general grant of power" and does not give cities the right to create 
monopolies or act in anticompetitive ways. Ordinance 7-4-10 clearly goes beyond this grant of 
authority. Even assuming the ordinance does nothing to prevent a person or corporate entity 
from delivering water from an outside source, nothing the state legislature has enacted would 
lead one to conclude that they meant for municipalities to establish a stranglehold on the delivery 
of water from their own water supply. The statute is unlawful and harms the welfare of the 
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community by being anticompetitive in violation of Article XII § 2 of the Idaho Constitution and 
LC. § 50-302. It must be struck down. 
In addition to violating our national policy of competition, the law is arbitrary. Sharing 
water cannot harm the person sharing, the person being shared with, the community, or the 
municipality. Further, nothing prevents a person or corporate entity from simply paying for 
another person's water bill, or having one household pay the minimum water bill but live off the 
neighbor's water source. The state's proffered sanitary issue is irrelevant- the city has no 
ordinance controlling how the water is delivered to those paying- it has made no attempt to 
interdict those who would drink from the hose at their own home or would use rusty lead pipes. 
Ordinance 7-4-10 is clearly not related to sanitary issues. The ordinance is utterly arbitrary and 
must be struck down. 
I I. 
A. Introduction 
The Magistrate Court erred in not finding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is 
unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case. The Court was provided with a summary of 
the facts and the testimony of Ms. Brown and found no issue with the application of the statute. 
Criminalizing the act of charitably gifting water one has paid for to another goes beyond the 
boundaries of our national values and this Court should find Ordinance 7-4-10 unconstitutional 
as applied to this case. 
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B. Standard of Review 
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, this Court 
reviews that decision directly and examines the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the 
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 
672 (2008); State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711 (Ct. App. 2008). An appellate court exercises 
free review over questions oflaw. Button, 134 Idaho 814; Powell, 130 Idaho atl25. 
C. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 violates the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I §§ 1, 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution as applied to the facts of this case. 
This case is about a man who took pity on a neighbor and gave her, her children, and her 
grandchildren water to use at home. No reasonable person could read Ordinance 7-4-10 to have 
intended this as a consequence of its unclear language. See Argument LC, supra. 
Further, it is well-established that free alienation is a property right. See Bruno v. First 
Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Boise, 115 Idaho 1104 (1989). But charitable giving is something 
more profound; it is a value that predates and is part and parcel of our rights. 
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'There was a statute in Bologna that whoever drew blood in the streets should be 
severely punished, and yet it was held not to apply to the case of a barber who 
opened a vein in the street. It is commanded in the decalogue that no work shall 
be done upon the Sabbath, and yet giving the command a rational interpretation 
founded upon its design the Infallible Judge held that it did not prohibit works of 
necessity, charity, or benevolence on that day.' 
In 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 91, the learned author observes with reference to 
the construction of statutes: 
'If there arise out of them any absurd consequences manifestly contradictory to 
common reason, they are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void * * * 
When some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happen to be 
unreasonable, then the judges are, in decency, to conclude that the consequence 
was not foreseen by the Parliament, and, therefore, they are at liberty to expound 
the statute by equity and only quoad hoc disregard it.' 
Discargar v. City of Seattle, 171 P.2d 205,209 (Wash.1946) citing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 
189 (N.Y. 1889). Writing in concurrence in Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 151 
(1943) Justice Murphy wrote: 
[ a ]s construed by the state courts and applied to the case at bar, the Struthers 
ordinance prohibits door to door canvassing of any kind, no matter what its 
character and purpose may be, if attended by the distribution of written or printed 
matter in the form of a circular or pamphlet. I do not believe that this outright 
prohibition is warranted. As I understand it, the distribution of circulars and 
pamphlets is a relatively minor aspect of the problem. The primary concern is 
with the act of canvassing as a source of inconvenience and annoyance to 
householders. But if the city can prohibit canvassing for the purpose of 
distributing religious pamphlets, it can also outlaw the door to door solicitations 
of religious charities, or the activities of the holy mendicant who begs alms 
from house to house to serve the material wants of his fellowmen and thus 
obtain spiritual comfort for his own soul. 
Prohibition may be more convenient to the law maker, and easier to fashion than a 
regulatory measure which adequately protects the peace and privacy of the home 
without suppressing legitimate religious activities. But that does not justify a 
repressive enactment like the one now before us. Freedom of religion has a higher 
dignity under the Constitution than municipal or personal convenience. In these 
days free men have no loftier responsibility than the preservation of that freedom. 
A nation dedicated to that ideal will not suffer but will prosper in its observance. 
(emphasis added). 
Id. citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1937). According to Marriam-Webster, the 
word charity originated in the 13th Century. Marriam-Webster, charity, http://www.merriam-
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webster.com/dictionary/charity (last accessed March 7, 2013). The Bible makes many references 
to charity, for example: 
And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to 
be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Charity suffereth long, 
and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up. And 
now stays faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity. 
1 Corinthians 13:3-13. 
Thus it is hard to believe that the expression of kindness that is charity is without 
constitutional protection. Whether that protection comes from the First, Fifth, Ninth, or 
Fourteenth Amendment, or a conglomeration of the four, the fact remains that a law that 
punishes giving water to the poor and thirsty is abominable. The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution protects from governmental intrusion: 
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those personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply 
rooted in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of 
constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.FNl 9 
FNl 9. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("[T]he 
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of 
the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" ( emphasis 
added)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-486 (1965) (intrusions into 
the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" offend rights "older than the Bill of 
Rights"); id., at 495-496 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (the law in question 
"disrupt[ ed] the traditional relation of the family-a relation as old and as 
fundamental as our entire civilization"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal 
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness"); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 
78, 95 (1987) ( "[T]he decision to marry is a fundamental right"); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (stating that at the founding and throughout the 19th century, 
"a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy"); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage 
and procreation are fundamental"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (liberty includes "those 
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men"). 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727-28 n.19 (1997). 
Moreover, if Article I § I of the Idaho Constitution, which states: 
[a]ll men are by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among 
which are enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and 
protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing safety 
is to be deemed to have any meaning whatsoever, it should be read to protect a person's right to 
freely give of themselves to those less fortunate. 
There is a practical reason for courts to acknowledge this, and the District Court did so. 
Intermediate Appellate Opinion at* 12. No matter how it tries, the government will likely never 
be able to stop the American people from doing good. Outlawing charity will only breed 
martyrs. This is not a path that the government of this municipality, state, or nation wants to go 
down. This ordinance goes beyond the boundaries of protecting to actually harming our 
society's welfare. The District Court found that because other ways of giving were possible 
under the circumstances of this case, it was permissible to criminalize this form of charity. The 
Court thus splits hairs over giving money rather than giving water. To determine that money 
may be freely given but that water may not is truly a sad commentary on our society. The 
criminalization of pure good is not permitted under our system of ordered liberty. This 




The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate Court's interpretation of the 
ordinance. Due to the Magistrate Court's error, the defendant was tried under the wrong 
elements, and the finding of guilt must be reversed. 
B. Standard of Review 
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Button, 134 Idaho 814; 
Powell, 130 Idaho at 125. 
C. The Magistrate Court's reading of the statute was incorrect, and therefore the defendant 
was tried under the wrong elements. 
The Magistrate Court construed Ordinance 7-4-10 to mean: 
[e]ssentially, what it prohibits, is uh, improperly connect to the city water system, 
improperly interfering with or tampering with that system, uh, improperly 
connecting and delivering water to third persons under certain circumstances, and 
then improperly operating or introducing a substance into any part of the water 
system, again under certain circumstances. 
Tr Vol. I, p. 27, L. 10-17. The Court instructed the jury: 
the essential elements of the crime of unlawful act re~arding water system which 
the defendant is charged are: One, on or about the 2gt of September 2012; two, in 
Kootenai County, State of Idaho; three, the defendant, Michael J. Freitas; 
permitted connection or delivery of city water; four, to third persons; five, for use 
within a residence; six, not otherwise provided with water service. If any of the 
above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. 
Tr. Vol.II,p.104,L.17-25;p.105,L.1-3. 
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The District Court found that this instruction was permissible. However, the ordinance, if 
read according to the rules of statutory construction for criminal statutes, has nothing to do with 
this case. The ordinance refers to interfering with, tampering with, turning on or oil: permitting 
connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence or other building not 
otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this chapter. The statute is best read to 
mean that it would be unlawful for anyone to interfere with, tamper, turn on or off, permit 
connection or delivery of water to another within a residence or building- directly from city's 
water system. The water system extends to the "standard service connection" to the "main 
distribution line." See Ordinances 7-4-3 and 7-4-4. In other words, the ordinance seeks to outlaw 
acts that would either do harm to the water system or siphon water from it without paying- such 
as digging up the water line and making a new connection to it. It has no application to water 
drawn and properly paid for by a citizen through private, legally connected piping. With this 
reading, the ordinance follows the nature and purpose of statutes such as I.C. § 18-4621 (stealing 
electrical current) and I.C. § 18-4301-10 (irrigation systems). If this is a reasonable reading of 
the statute it must also be the correct one. State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho at 325. Therefore, the 
elements instruction was incorrect at trial and the judgment must be reversed. 
IV. 
A. Introduction 
The District Court the state failed to provide sufficient evidence for all the elements. 
36 
B. Standard of Review 
On review, this Court must determine whether "the evidence is sufficient to sustain a 
conviction of the crime charged." State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927, 930 (1994). This Court 
examines the evidence to determine whether a reasonable mind could conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant's guilt as to each material element of the offense was proven. 
State v. DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352,355 (1996). 
C. The state failed to produce sufficient evidence for a conviction. 
Under the state's elements instruction, the state had to prove that the water the defendant 
provided his neighbors came from the City of Spirit Lake. The state introduced only the 
following evidence as to this element- when asked whether she had had a conversation with the 
defendant, Officer Wise also testified that at the time she gave him the citation, Mr. Freitas said 
that: 
"it was something to the effect that um, he didn't really realize - - he didn't think that 
there was anything wrong as far - - as long as the water was going through his meter and 
he's paying for it, that he said he should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with his 
water, that he could put it in his yard or give it to a neighbor." 
Tr Vol. II, p. 89, L. 19-25, p. 90, L. 1-3. 
The officer had previously given him a copy of the text of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Tr Vol. 
II, p. 85, L. 1-5. 
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As discussed in Argument LC., supra, the Ordinance is not a model of clarity. It is 
therefore impossible to draw a conclusion as to where the defendant received his water. He 
could very well have been simply arguing about the ordinance. He may have water from a 
different water system that goes through a meter. The jury was not instructed that only one 
possible source of water could have a meter attached. 
The Magistrate Court and the District Court agreed that the jury could reasonably infer 
from these statements that the defendant used city water, but that is not supported by the totality 
of the circumstances in this case. The facts in this case do not allow a reasonable person to 




If the Magistrate Court did not err in dismissing the case because Spirit Lake Ordinance 
7-4-10 is constitutional, then the Court erred in refusing the defendant's proposed jury 
instruction that the city's property did not extend beyond the meter. 
B. Standard of Review 
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Button, 134 Idaho 814; 
Powell, 130 Idaho at 125. 
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C. The defendant was entitled to his proposed jury instruction. 
The defendant requested that the jury be instructed as to the language at the start of the 
ordinance. The City of Spirit Lake thought it was important to include it, and the defendant 
believed it is as well. The Idaho Supreme Court held, in State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 694 
(1987): 
Where the jury instructions, taken as a whole, correctly state the law and are not 
inconsistent, but may be reasonably and fairly harmonized, it will be assumed that 
the jury gave due consideration to the whole charge and was not misled by any 
isolated portion thereof. 
Due to the difficult of deciphering what Ordinance 7-4-10 intends, it is difficult to know whether 
or not the language requested is necessary to understand it, but because it is a criminal charge, 
the defendant argues that the jury should have been able to view all of the law- particularly since 
an element of the crime required the defendant to be using the city's water. The defendant 
argues that the intention of the statute was to criminalize someone tapping directly into the city's 
waterline and taking water and providing it to those who are not receiving their water legally 
from the city. The Magistrate and the District Courts held that the water a person purchases from 
the city cannot be given to a third person in a house that is not getting water from the city. Since 




The case before this Court requires it to review an ordinance that violates the values of 
the community by being both anticompetitive and anticharity. The ordinance is impossible to 
understand from a layman's perspective, goes beyond the powers vested in the municipality that 
passed it, and most of all an improper and arbitrary abuse of power. This Court must strike it 
down and reverse the judgment. 
Even if this Court does find a way to save the ordinance from nullification, the 
interpretation of the ordinance by the lower Court was faulty, and the whole law was hidden 
from the jury's view. The judgment cannot stand, and this Court should reverse it and remand. 
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